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This study compared difficulties in emotion regulation among primary, secondary, 
and low callous-unemotional (CU) youth in a sample of 417 detained adolescents (306 
boys, 111 girls). Mixture modeling on the basis of posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD) 
symptoms identified two groups of youth high in CU traits consistent with primary and 
secondary CU. Youth were typologized on the basis of PTSD symptoms which represents 
a novel method that is consistent with the theory underlying secondary callousness. 
Compared to youth classified in the primary group, youth classified as secondary CU 
reported higher levels of PTSD symptoms, anxiety, trauma exposure, and difficulties with 
clarity of emotions and nonacceptance of emotions. Difficulties in emotion regulation 
reported by youth in the secondary versus primary groups may be related to processes 
involving emotional numbing in the aftermath of posttraumatic distress. The results of the 
current study have implications for the classification of primary and secondary CU as 
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Recent research on the development of delinquency has focused on the role of 
callous-unemotional (CU) traits, a construct related to the adult concept of psychopathy 
that is thought to characterize a proportion of juvenile offenders. Callous-unemotional 
traits among youth are defined by low levels of empathy and remorse, lack of response to 
punishment, and deficits in emotional processing particularly related to fear and anxiety 
(Frick & Marsee, 2006; Frick & White, 2008; Kerig & Stellwagen, 2010). Among youth 
involved with the juvenile justice system, those high in callous-unemotional traits are 
thought to have a stable, severe, and aggressive trajectory (Frick & White, 2008). For 
these reasons, a specifier has been proposed for the presence of CU traits as indicating a 
subtype of youth with the diagnosis of conduct disorder in the forthcoming Diagnostic 
and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, Fifth Edition (DSM-5). Consequently, 
significant attention has been drawn to the need to identify these youth and to develop 
more effective strategies for deterring them from an antisocial pathway.  
However, emerging research suggests that there may be two groups of youth high 
in CU traits, arriving at the same outcome from distinct developmental trajectories. 
Differentiating between these two trajectories to juvenile delinquency is an issue of 
importance for the legal system in reducing recidivism, for the mental health system in 
identifying which youth should be prioritized for treatment, and for researchers 
attempting to identify risk and protective factors for delinquency (Frick, 2009). To this 
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end, the present study investigated the hypothesis that youth with primary versus 
secondary callousness can be differentiated on the basis of PTSD symptoms, and further 
that these two groups differ in their ability to regulate emotion. To set the stage for the 
present study, first the literature on primary versus secondary CU is reviewed, then focus 
is turned to the role of PTSD in delinquency generally and its relation to CU traits, and 
then I discuss the hypothesized role of emotion dysregulation in primary versus 
secondary callousness. 
 
Distinguishing between Primary and Secondary CU 
According to theorists (e.g., Blair, Pesehardt, Budhani, Mitchell, & Pine, 2006), 
primary callousness arises as a function of a genetically-based deficit in emotion 
processing that results in a lack of anxiety and guilt. The lack of responsiveness to others’ 
negative emotional cues demonstrated by individuals with classic psychopathy or CU is 
believed to contribute to diminished sensitivity to others’ distress and to punishment cues 
(Cleckley, 1941). One connection between primary CU traits and delinquent behavior is 
based on the notion that individuals high in CU traits are unable to experience moral 
emotions such as guilt, remorse, and empathy and therefore their ability to recognize 
distress in a victim is impaired (Blair, 1995; 1999). However, more recent research has 
identified heterogeneity among individuals high in CU traits, and emotion processing has 
been key to distinguishing between the two types.  For example, Kimonis and colleagues 
(2012) determined that two distinct variants of youth high in CU traits also differ on the 
processing of emotional cues from others, which has been considered central to the 
concept of CU. Kimonis and colleagues (2012) found that among male juvenile 
offenders, individuals with secondary CU traits were more engaged by distressing 
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emotional images than were youth with primary CU traits. Therefore, individuals with 
secondary CU traits may not show the same deficit in empathy that is considered 
characteristic of primary CU.  
Contrary to the classic conceptualization of psychopathy and primary CU, the 
concept of “secondary psychopathy” (Karpman, 1941) or “acquired callousness” (Kerig 
& Becker, 2010) asserts that individuals who have experienced heightened emotional 
reactivity through traumatic victimization can develop a callous appearance over time. 
Whereas youth high in primary CU traits are categorized by deficits in processing others’ 
emotional states, youth with secondary CU traits may be more prone to deficits in 
regulating their own emotional states. Bowlby (1944) described the home lives of 44 
juvenile offenders and noted that one group, who seemed to present with a lack of 
affection for others, were more likely than the other youth to have lost a mother figure in 
childhood. Bowlby (1944) remarked that “behind the mask of indifference is bottomless 
misery and behind the apparent callousness despair” (p. 24). These youth, rather than 
having an emotional deficit, are viewed as hiding their heightened emotional distress by 
presenting a “mask” of callousness. Given that skills such as emotion regulation are 
typically learned through early interactions with caregivers (Kerig, Ludlow, & Wenar, 
2012), these youth who have experienced trauma, often at the hands of caregivers, may 
be especially susceptible to deficits in their own abilities to react appropriately to 
emotional stimuli. These emotional difficulties experienced by youth with trauma 
histories may help to explain the link between trauma and delinquency for youth with 
secondary CU traits. 
Although researchers have found an association between trauma and delinquency, 
the mechanisms through which this occurs are not well understood. Wood, Foy, Layne, 
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Pynoos, and James (2002) assessed trauma exposure in a sample of male and female 
juvenile offenders, and found that the youths’ history of physical punishment in 
childhood accounted for 10% of the variance in gun possession and use in girls, and that 
community violence exposure accounted for an additional 20% of the variance. Trauma 
exposure also was associated with higher levels of gang involvement for boys and girls. 
Studies have suggested that the link between trauma exposure or maltreatment in 
childhood and delinquency may be even stronger for girls (see Kerig & Becker, 2010, for 
a review). It is possible that the emotional difficulties that are experienced by youth with 
secondary CU traits, having developed in response to trauma exposure, are placing these 
youth at further risk for delinquent behavior. The current study adds to the literature 
connecting trauma and delinquency by using PTSD symptoms to differentiate between 
primary and secondary variants of high-CU youth, and further examining the role of 
emotion dysregulation for these groups.  
Following Bowlby’s (1944) logic, Porter (1996) theorized that trauma-exposed 
youth may develop a learned detachment from emotion in contrast to the inherent 
emotional deficits seen in primary callous youth.  Porter theorized that individuals with 
secondary CU traits have the capability to respond empathetically to others, but that their 
reactions to others’ emotions are inhibited by attempts to avoid feeling their own negative 
emotions. This strategy of avoidance of emotions is reinforced as a coping technique over 
time because it is less painful than allowing themselves to continue feeling vulnerable. 
Ford, Chapman, Mack, and Pearson (2006) termed this mechanism “survival coping,” 
wherein youth who have been traumatically victimized develop an angry, hostile, or 
callous façade as a form of coping that is associated with delinquent behavior. This 
theory may help to explain Kimonis and colleagues’ (2012) results by suggesting that 
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youth with secondary CU traits are better than youth with primary CU traits at 
recognizing negative emotional cues in others because they have experienced those same 
emotions themselves through their own histories of trauma exposure.   
 
The Role of Posttraumatic Stress Disorder in Secondary CU 
Rates of trauma exposure are high among juvenile justice-involved youth. For 
example, Abram et al. (2004) found that over 92% of a sample of nearly 900 youth in 
juvenile detention had experienced at least 1 traumatic event, over half had experienced 
more than 6 traumatic events, and the average number of traumas experienced was 14. 
Consistent with the high rates of trauma exposure, posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD) 
is among the most prevalent psychiatric disorders in the juvenile justice system. Studies 
have found the prevalence of PTSD to be as high as 50% among detained girls and as 
high as 30% for detained boys (Kerig & Becker, 2012). Further, research has indicated 
that for some youth, PTSD status is predictive of recidivism, and that repeat offending is 
associated with increased mental health issues (Becker, Kerig, Lim, & Ezechukwu, 
2011).  
Because the vast majority of youth in detention have experienced trauma, 
including youth with both primary and secondary CU traits, the severity of PTSD 
symptoms may better discriminate subtypes of youth high in CU. Based on Porter’s 
(1996) theory and the work of Ford and colleagues (2006), it would be predicted that 
those youth who developed PTSD symptoms in response to trauma are at heightened risk 
to develop callousness and engage in delinquency as a result. Research to date confirms 
that detained youth with secondary CU traits exhibit higher levels of PTSD symptoms 
than do youth with primary CU traits or nondetained comparison samples (Krischer & 
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Sevecke, 2008; Sink, 2010; Tatar, Cauffman, Kimonis, & Skeem, 2012). Vaughn, Edens, 
Howard, and Smith (2009) found evidence for the identification of distinct groups of 
youth with primary and secondary CU traits using trauma exposure as a differentiating 
variable. Tatar and colleagues (2012) were the first to assess trauma exposure using more 
than a few items, and were among the first to assess a range of potential traumatic 
experiences beyond types of child abuse. The authors found that the secondary group 
endorsed 30% more traumatic experiences than either the primary or low-CU comparison 
sample, and there was no difference in trauma exposure between the primary and 
comparison samples. The authors investigated group differences in PTSD symptoms as 
well and determined that the secondary group endorsed 28% more past PTSD symptoms 
than the primary group or the comparison group. One limitation of this study is that it 
included only male adolescents, and research has shown that there may be a stronger link 
between PTSD and delinquency for girls (Kerig & Becker, 2010), although it must be 
acknowledged that  other studies have identified an association between trauma exposure 
and callousness for boys but not girls (Krischer & Sevecke, 2008). Therefore, further 
research is needed to clarify whether levels of PTSD symptoms differentiate between 
primary and secondary CU among both male and female adolescents. To this end, the 
present study uses a measure of PTSD symptoms to form groups of youth with primary 
and secondary CU traits using a sample of detained boys and girls. 
 
Anxiety as a Differentiator between Primary and Secondary Callousness 
Whereas theoretically the experience of anxiety is antithetical to the concept of 
psychopathy (Cleckley, 1941), research examining the association between CU and 
anxiety has been mixed, likely due to the majority of studies failing to distinguish 
7 
 
between primary and secondary variants (Dolan & Rennie, 2007). When both primary 
and secondary CU traits are considered, many studies have suggested that individuals 
with secondary CU traits report higher levels of anxiety than those with primary traits, 
and trait anxiety has continued to serve as the most commonly used differentiator of 
primary and secondary variants of high-CU youth (e.g., Krischer & Sevecke, 2008; Lee, 
Salekin, & Iselin, 2010; Skeem, Poythress, Edens, Lilienfeld, & Cale, 2003). However, 
the empirical evidence for using anxiety as the sole basis for differentiating these groups 
is not entirely clear. Despite findings indicating CU traits to be inversely related to 
anxiety in general, Skeem and colleagues (2003) reviewed the literature and concluded 
that there is little compelling evidence that either children or adults classified in the 
primary or secondary variants reliably differ on measures of anxiety, given that a number 
of studies have found null results (e.g., Schmitt & Newman, 1999). One explanation for 
the lack of consistent differences in anxiety may be the prevalent experience of trauma 
among delinquent youth. Kalisch and colleagues (2005) argued that the experience of 
anxiety for youth in conditions of ongoing trauma exposure may be maladaptive, and 
these youth may avoid subjective distress through learned emotional numbing, consistent 
with Porter’s (1996) theory. Relatedly, emotional numbing has been identified as a 
mediator of the association between trauma exposure and CU traits for juvenile justice-
involved youth (Kerig, Bennett, Thompson & Becker, 2012). The majority of studies 
have focused on psychopathy among adults, and it is possible that differences in anxiety 
are obscured by the progression of emotional numbing over time. Based on the mixed 
efficacy of identifying subgroups on the basis of anxiety, the current study sought to 
differentiate primary and secondary variants of high-CU adolescents using PTSD 





Differences in Emotion Dysegulation between  
Primary and Secondary CU 
Functionally, emotions are intended to prepare an individual for action (Cole & 
Hall, 2008). As described in an overview by Cole and Hall (2008), emotions serve an 
ongoing evaluative purpose to determine the level of threat present in a situation and 
organize action in response to threat. Emotion regulation is the process of cuing 
modulation of emotional reactions based on changes in one’s circumstances. According 
to Cole and Hall (2008), emotion dysregulation does not imply that emotions are not 
being regulated, but rather that there is a cost associated with the way the emotions are 
being regulated. For example, the experience of negative emotions does not suggest 
dysregulation as long as the experience of the emotion leads to organized behavior. 
Similarly, the experience of positive emotions can be inappropriate in some situations.  
Emotion dysregulation is believed to underlie many forms of psychopathology, 
and is considered to be a key component of PTSD. Conceptually PTSD is characterized 
by a number of emotional reactions to a traumatic event. Involuntary repetitive intrusive 
episodes alternate with periods of denial, avoidance, and emotional numbing. Horowitz 
(2011) argued that PTSD is inherently a disorder of dysregulated emotion, describing the 
“phasic tendencies” of types of PTSD symptoms (re-experiencing, avoidance) as 
indicative of a struggle to achieve emotional equilibrium. Similarly, Cole, Michel and 
Teti (1994) described that emotion dysregulation can be problematic in two ways: 
underregulation, as with issues of impulse control, or overregulation, such as emotional 
numbing. In order to have effective emotion regulation, a balance must be achieved. 
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Cognitive control of emotion theory asserts that the intensity of an emotional response is 
determined by mismatch between the level of threat a person appraises from their 
circumstance and the availability of coping resources. In this way, PTSD is characterized 
by a feedback loop between emotions and cognitions attempting to modulate emotional 
responses to perceived threat in order to reach an optimal equilibrium between 
underregulation and overregulation of emotions. 
Despite the importance given to emotion regulation in Horowitz’s (2011) 
framework of PTSD, few studies have investigated the role of emotion regulation in 
PTSD, and to date none have done so among youth. Gratz and Roemer (2004) described 
an integrative conceptualization of emotion regulation comprising six dimensions: 
nonacceptance of emotional responses, difficulty engaging in goal-directed behavior 
when under stress, impulse control difficulties when under stress, lack of emotional 
awareness, limited access to emotion regulation strategies, and lack of emotional clarity. 
Using this conceptualization, a total of four known studies have examined the relation of 
emotion dysregulation to PTSD symptoms in adults. Using a sample of undergraduates, 
the majority of whom were female and had subclinical levels of PTSD symptoms, Tull, 
Barrett, McMillan, and Roemer (2007) found that emotion dysregulation overall was 
associated with more severe PTSD symptoms, and that PTSD symptom severity was 
associated with five of the six elements of emotion dysregulation they examined: 
nonacceptance of emotional responses, difficulty engaging in goal-directed behavior 
when under stress, impulse control difficulties when under stress, limited access to 
emotion regulation strategies, and lack of emotional clarity; but not  lack of emotional 
awareness. Similarly, McDermott and colleagues (2009) identified that, among a sample 
of patients in a residential substance dependence program, those with PTSD had greater 
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difficulty with emotion regulation, evidencing significantly higher scores on the same 
five elements of emotion dysregulation identified by McDermott and colleagues (2009). 
In turn, Ehring and Quack (2010) compared adults with noninterpersonal trauma, early-
onset chronic interpersonal trauma, early-onset single-incident interpersonal trauma, and 
late-onset interpersonal trauma. The authors concluded that whereas those with early-
onset chronic trauma had greater difficulties with emotion regulation on each of the six 
facets examined in the previous studies, group differences were only significant for lack 
of awareness, lack of clarity, difficulties with goal-directed behavior, and difficulty with 
impulse control, and after controlling for PTSD symptom severity, only lack of clarity 
and difficulties with goal-directed behavior remained significant. Finally, Weiss, Tull, 
Davis, Dehon, Fulton, and Gratz (2012) sought to determine whether emotion 
dysregulation differences were more related to trauma exposure in general or the 
development of PTSD. In a sample of African American undergraduate women, the 
authors found that participants who met criteria for PTSD had higher levels of overall 
emotion dysregulation as well as higher scores on of the facets of nonacceptance of 
emotions, difficulties engaging in goal-directed behavior, difficulties controlling 
impulsive behavior, and lack of access to effective strategies as compared to those with 
no Criterion A traumatic events or with Criterion A experiences but without PTSD. These 
results suggest that rather than the experience of trauma in general, emotion 
dysregulation difficulties are more closely associated with the development of PTSD 
symptoms. 
Despite the lack of attention paid to youth in the literature to date, studies 
suggests that emotion regulation deficits associated with PTSD may be especially 
important for youth involved in the juvenile justice system. It is known that both PTSD 
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and CU are related to a higher likelihood of delinquency and that each are related to 
emotion dysregulation.  For youth with PTSD and CU traits, emotion dysregulation 
issues are interfering with their functioning in ways that are directly contributing to their 
delinquency and thereby placing them at risk for continued problems. In order to better 
understand youth with secondary CU traits, the literature on emotion dysregulation as 
associated with PTSD and CU must be merged.   
 
Interrelationships among PTSD, CU, and Emotion Regulation 
Among the dimensions of ER identified by Gratz and Roemer (2004) in their 
conceptual and empirical model, there are four that emerge as clearly related to the 
intersection between PTSD and callousness in the literature to date: nonacceptance of 
emotional responses, lack of emotional awareness, lack of emotional clarity, and impulse 
control difficulties when under stress.   
 
Nonacceptance of Emotional Responses  
Secondary CU is believed to arise out of efforts to avoid negative emotional 
states. Cole and Hall (2008) concluded that the ability to mask emotional states develops 
as early as age 3 when youth begin to understand social norms regarding which emotions 
are acceptable to feel and to whom those emotions can be shown. Ford and colleagues’ 
(2006) expansion on Porter’s (1996) theory suggested that some youth develop CU traits 
through the disavowal of their emotions following a history of victimization in an attempt 
to regain a sense of control over themselves and their situation, thereby creating a callous 
façade. Youth with secondary CU traits, therefore, mask emotions associated with 
vulnerability that they find to be unacceptable for them to show. This masking of 
12 
 
vulnerable emotions is contrary to the inherent deficits in the experience of certain 
emotions displayed by youth with primary CU traits.  
 
Emotional Clarity 
Alexithymia, or the inability to identify and describe one’s own emotional states, 
is likely associated with the experience of trauma. For example, using a sample of 
Holocaust survivors, Yehuda and colleagues (1997) found that alexithymia was 
associated with severity of PTSD symptoms but not severity of trauma exposure, and the 
group without PTSD but with trauma exposure demonstrated alexithymia levels similar 
to the general population. These findings suggest that trauma exposure alone is not 
predictive of emotion dysregulation in terms of emotional clarity, but that rather the 
development of PTSD symptoms coincides with difficulties identifying and describing 
one’s own emotional states. Consistent with theory as it applies to primary and secondary 
CU traits, alexithymia may arise through a process of emotional numbing. Yehuda and 
colleagues (1997) found higher correlations between alexithymia and the PTSD symptom 
clusters of avoidance and hyperarousal, which may be indicative of an attempt to seek 
equilibrium between the experience of heightened emotional states and avoidance of 
trauma-related sensations described by Horowitz (2011). Conceptually, therefore, 
alexithymia should be related to secondary CU traits. In one study comparing primary 
and secondary CU traits, Lander, Lutz-Zois, Rye and Goodnight (2012) found that 
alexithymia was associated with secondary but not primary psychopathy among 
undergraduate students. However, Grieve and Mahar (2009) found alexithymia to be 
associated with both primary and secondary psychopathy. The literature on alexithymia 
and CU variants is inconsistent, perhaps because the association is dependent on the 
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process of emotional numbing. Research has shown that the numbing of emotions 
mediates the association between trauma exposure and CU traits for some youth (Kerig et 
al., 2012), and it may be possible that as youth with secondary CU become more numb 
over time, they are less able to identify their emotional states and begin to more closely 
resemble youth with primary CU traits. It is important to include PTSD when examining 
differences in the labeling and regulation of emotions among high-CU youth in order to 
disentangle the potential role of emotional numbing by better identifying youth with 
secondary CU traits. Therefore, the current study included PTSD symptoms in the model 
differentiating primary and secondary CU in order to help to account for the potential role 
of emotional numbing. 
 
Impulse Control Difficulties 
The experience of trauma and subsequent development of PTSD alters the way 
individuals’ stress response systems work to interpret new information, which may be 
directly related to issues of impulsivity (Ford, 2009). Traumatized individuals who have 
developed PTSD are characterized by use of a “survival brain” that overrides brain 
functioning that might be dedicated to areas such as learning or managing distress in 
favor of self-preservation (Ford, 2009). As the brain develops following childhood 
trauma, the focus on survival becomes further automated through processes of 
synaptogenesis and pruning. Kimonis and colleagues (2011) found that juvenile offenders 
with primary CU traits evidenced better impulse control relative to those classified as 
having secondary CU traits. Similarly, Snowden and Gray (2011) found that adults 
classified as secondary psychopaths demonstrated greater impulsivity related to thinking 
without acting and planning for the future as compared to those with primary 
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psychopathy. These results are consistent with research examining the types of 
aggression most commonly perpetrated by individuals with primary versus secondary CU 
traits.  Primary CU traits have been associated with manipulation of others, especially 
among boys (Grieve & Mahar, 2009) and with more instrumental, planned forms of 
aggression (Kerig & Stellwagen, 2010) whereas individuals with secondary CU traits 
tend to engage more often in reactive, emotionally-driven aggression (e.g., Falkenbach, 
Poythress, & Creevy, 2008). For youth whose cognitive resources are being utilized for 
processes geared toward self-preservation, few cognitive resources are available for the 
higher-order processes necessary for inhibition control. Therefore, youth with secondary 
CU traits are likely to have greater emotion regulation difficulties related to impulsivity. 
 
The Current Study 
The current study built on previous research by investigating several facets of 
emotion dysregulation among boys and girls with primary and secondary CU traits in a 
juvenile justice population. The majority of previous work has focused on psychopathy in 
adult populations, whereas much less is known about CU traits in youth. Additionally, the 
majority of work attempting to differentiate between primary and secondary youth has 
utilized all male samples, whereas it has been suggested that the experience of trauma 
and PTSD may be more strongly associated with delinquency for girls (Kerig & Becker, 
2010). By addressing limitations to previous work using anxiety as the differentiating 
factor between primary and secondary callousness, the current study merged the literature 
on PTSD and CU in terms of emotion dysregulation in order to offer a broadened 
understanding of how these processes contribute to delinquency in a way that is 
consistent with theory on the development of CU traits in response to a history of trauma 
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(Porter, 1996). First, we investigated whether two distinct groups of youth high in CU 
traits could be identified on the basis of posttraumatic stress symptoms. We expected to 
find that the secondary variant would score higher on PTSD symptoms, and would also 
report higher levels of anxiety compared to youth with primary CU traits, but that the two 
groups would not differ significantly on levels of CU traits. Next, we used these 
groupings to examine mean differences on emotion dysregulation. Based on previous 
work and theory regarding PTSD and CU, it was expected that youth with secondary CU 
traits would evidence less acceptance of emotional responses, less emotional clarity, and 
more impulsivity. Given that posttraumatic emotional numbing is hypothesized to be a 
process that becomes more automated over time, it was unclear whether the groups would 
differ on their reports of their awareness of their own emotional states. Because there is 
insufficient literature on the other dimensions of ER used in the current study to inform 
directional hypotheses, this study also examined in an exploratory fashion how these two 
groups of youth differ in terms of their access to emotion regulation strategies and 










Participants included 417 youth (306 boys, 111 girls) recruited from a juvenile 
detention center located in the West. Youth ranged in age from 12 to 18 (M = 16.15, SD = 
1.28) and 57.6% were non-Latino White/Caucasian, 4.3% Black/African American, 
24.0% Hispanic/Latino, 3.1% Native American/Alaskan Native, 5.0% Pacific 
Islander/Native Hawaiian, 4.3% multiracial, 1.2% Asian American, and 0.5% other. 




The Inventory of Callous Unemotional traits (ICU; Frick, 2004) is a 24-item self-
report measure that was developed to provide an efficient and reliable assessment of CU 
traits in samples of youth. Confirmatory factor analyses show the presence of three 
independent factors (i.e., Uncaring, Callous, and Unemotional) that relate to a higher-
order Callous-Unemotional dimension.  The Unemotional factor consists of 5 items (e.g., 
“I do not show my emotions to others”), the Callous factor consists of 9 items (e.g., “I do 
not care who I hurt to get what I want”), and the Uncaring factor consists of 8 items (e.g., 
“I feel bad or guilty when I do something wrong,” reverse coded). Items are scored on a 
4-point Likert-type scale ranging from 0 (not true at all) to 3 (definitely true). Validation 
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of the measure indicated internal consistency ranging from .74 to .81 and construct 
validity as related positively to aggression and delinquency and negatively to empathy 
and positive affect (Kimonis et al., 2008). In the present sample, internal consistencies 
were .86 for the total scale, .74 for Unemotional, .73 for Callous, and .80 for Uncaring. 
The total scale score was used in the analyses for the current study. 
 
PTSD Symptoms 
The UCLA Posttraumatic Stress Disorder Reaction Index—Adolescent Version 
(PTSD-RI; Steinberg, Brymer, Decker, & Pynoos, 2004) is  widely-used measure to 
screen for exposure to trauma and PTSD among youth which has demonstrated good 
convergent validity with other diagnostic measures, high internal consistency (α = .90), 
and high test-retest reliability (.84) over a period of 7 days (Roussos et al., 2005).  The 
first set of questions asks youth whether they have been exposed to each of 24 specific 
traumatic events and the number of events endorsed is summed to create a Total Trauma 
Exposure score. Youth in the current sample reported experiencing between 0 and 21 
different traumatic events (M = 7.59, SD = 4.53) with nearly 95% of the sample having 
experienced at least one potentially traumatic event. The second set of PTSD-RI 
questions inquire as to whether the youth experienced subjective reactions to that event 
that are consistent with DSM-IV Criterion A. If Criterion A is met, the remaining 
questions ask youth to rate the extent to which they have experienced in the past month 
any of the symptoms associated with Criterion B (intrusion), Criterion C 
(avoidance/numbing), and Criterion D (hyperarousal) as consistent with the DSM-IV. 
Responses to the questions are presented in a Likert scale format ranging from 0 (none of 
the time) to 4 (most of the time).  Over 17% of the current sample met diagnostic criteria 
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for PTSD at the time of the assessment and over 35% met the symptom endorsement 
necessary for at least two criteria. All 32 items were used to establish Total PTSD score. 
For the current sample, Cronbach’s alpha for the Total PTSD score was .94.  
 
External Criteria Measures 
Anxiety 
The Trauma Symptom Checklist for Children (TSCC; Briere, 1996) is a self-
report measure for youth that has five subscales which measure PTSD, anxiety, 
depression, anger, and dissociation symptoms. Only the nine item anxiety subscale was 
used in the present study. Each item is rated on a 4-point Likert-type scale ranging from 1 
(never) to 4 (almost all the time). Internal reliability and validity of the TSCC is 
supported (Briere, 1996), and for the current sample, Cronbach’s alpha for the anxiety 
subscale was .86. 
 
Emotion Dysregulation 
The Difficulties in Emotion Regulation Scale (DERS; Gratz & Roemer, 2004) is a 
36-item self-report questionnaire designed to assess multiple aspects of emotion 
dysregulation. The measure allows for a total score as well as scores on six subscales, 
reported here with Cronbach’s alpha in the current sample: Nonacceptance of emotional 
responses (Nonacceptance, 6 items, α = .82), difficulties engaging in goal directed 
behavior (Goals, 5 items, α = .82), impulse control difficulties (Impulse, 6 items, α = .86), 
lack of emotional awareness (Awareness, 6 items, α = .83), limited access to emotion 
regulation strategies (Strategies, 8 items, α = .85), and lack of emotional clarity (Clarity, 
5 items, α = .73). Each item is rated on a 5-point Likert-type scale ranging from 1 (almost 
19 
 
never) to 5 (almost always). Validation of the measure suggested high internal 
consistency for each subscale (α > .80) and the total score (α = .93) as well as high test-
retest reliability across 8 weeks of .88 for the total score (Gratz & Roemer, 2004). 
 
Procedure 
All study procedures were approved by the Institutional Review Boards (IRBs) of 
the University of Utah, Utah Department of Child and Family Services, and the Salt Lake 
Valley Detention Center.  At visitations to the detention center, legal guardians provided 
signed informed consent after which youth were invited to provide signed assent. To 
eliminate any perceptions of coercion, the IRBs required that no incentives be offered for 
participation. Youth interviews were conducted individually by a research assistant in a 





Means and standard deviations for the total sample, the low-CU comparison sample, and 
the primary and secondary clusters 
 
 
Total Sample  




(n = 279) 
Primary CU 
Cluster  
(n = 76) 
Secondary 
CU Cluster  
(n = 55) 
 M (SD) M (SD) M (SD) M (SD) 
Age 16.15 (1.28) 16.26 (1.26)a 15.85 (1.33)a 16.06 (1.32)a 
% Ethnic Minority  42.4 37.3a 50.0a 54.5a 
Total CU  22.33 (9.71) 16.93 (5.91)a 33.24 (5.60)b 33.62 (6.04)b 
Total Trauma Types 7.60 (4.52) 7.21 (4.53)a 6.44 (3.90)a 10.85 (3.72)b 
Total PTSD Score  23.71 (14.43) 22.42 (14.29)a
 16.41 (8.51)b 39.96 (8.38)c 
Anxiety 13.77 (4.35) 13.61 (4.19)a 12.74 (4.49)a
 15.78 (4.46)b 
DERS- 
Nonacceptance 




















DERS- Impulse 12.81 (5.20) 12.33 (5.12)a
 12.97 (4.91)ab 14.79 (5.54)b
 
Note. Seven youth classified as high-CU were missing all data on PTSD symptoms and 
therefore were not classified into either primary or secondary and are included in the total 
sample but not in any of the subgroups. Scores in the same row that do not share 










Classifying Primary and Secondary Variants 
Although research suggests that callous-unemotionality can be represented as a 
dimensional trait (e.g., Edens et al., 2006; Lilienfeld, 1994; 1998), the theory underlying 
CU proposes that youth at the extreme high end of the continuum constitute a distinct 
group by virtue of displaying pathological levels of CU. Accordingly Frick (2003) has 
argued that high-CU youth differ from other conduct-disordered youth and resemble the 
conceptualizations of adult psychopathy. Consistent with this idea, there is evidence of 
psychopathy as a taxonic trait (Vasey, Kotov, Frick, & Loney, 2005). In this regard, 
dividing a sample into low- and high-CU groups is appropriate if the high-CU group is 
categorically distinct, given that an underlying nonlinear relation is expected in 
categorical constructs (Sonuga-Barke, 1998). Therefore, research to date examining 
primary and secondary variants has used clustering techniques based upon the subset 
of youth in the sample who are high in CU traits. To allow for comparisons to this 
existing body of research, we followed the strategy utilized by previous investigators 
regarding primary and secondary CU (e.g., Finger et al., 2008; Hicks et al., 2010; 
Kimonis et al., 2010; Kimonis et al., 2012; Marsh et al., 2006; Tatar et al., 2012; Vitale et 
al., 2005) and employed a threshold cutoff score to select youth who scored high relative 
to the remainder of the sample. This strategy allows for a comparison of primary versus 
secondary clusters within this high-CU group while simultaneously allowing for a 
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comparison of these groups to a low-CU portion of the sample. Given that these previous 
studies have used different measures of CU traits than were utilized in the present study, 
and that no clinical cutoff score has been established for the ICU to identify youth as 
“high CU,” we followed the logic laid out by Skeem et al. (2007) and Murrie and Cornell 
(2002), who advocated for identifying as high-CU those participants scoring in the top 
third of a sample. In the current sample, this rubric resulted in classifying as high-CU 
those boys and girls who obtained ICU Total scores greater than 26 (n = 138). The 
remaining youth with ICU Total scores of 26 or lower (n = 279) were used as a 
comparison group. The characteristics of the total sample as well as each subsample are 
displayed in Table 1. 
Once the high-CU youth were identified using the cutoff score on the ICU, we 
used mixture modeling to classify the youth into two groups based on their PTSD 
symptom scores. The mixture model was performed using Mplus version 6.11 (Muthén & 
Muthén, 1998-2011) which was programmed to create two classes as consistent with the 
theory of primary and secondary CU, allowing factor means for Total PTSD Symptoms 
scores to vary across groups. All 32 items on the PTSD-RI were used in the model to 
comprise Total PTSD Symptoms scores. Of the 138 youth included in the mixture model, 
7 were missing data on PTSD and could not be classified. Of the remaining 131 youth, 76 
(11 girls) were placed in Class 1, labeled ‘primary,’ and 55 (20 girls) were placed in 
Class 2, labeled ‘secondary.’ The parametric bootstrapped likelihood ratio test suggested 
better fit of a 2-class model as compared to a 1-class model (H0 log likelihood = -
6544.064, p < .001). Average latent class probabilities for most likely latent class 
membership were .90 and .85, respectively, with off-diagonal probabilities of .15 and .10 
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indicating the degree of misclassification. Posterior probabilities for each class were 
extracted for use in later analyses.  
 
Validation of Clusters 
Using the most likely class assignment for each individual, independent-samples 
t-tests and chi square analyses suggested a number of group differences. As specified in 
the model, the secondary group reported significantly higher levels of PTSD symptoms, 
class 1 M = 2.25, SE = .19, 95% CI= [1.89, 2.62], class 2 M = 2.95, SE = .14, 95% CI = 
[2.67, 3.23]. A number of external variables were also examined for group differences. 
The secondary group reported significantly higher levels of anxiety, t (126) = -3.79, p < 
.001, and had a greater proportion of girls than the primary group, χ2 (1) = 8.27, p = .004. 
The primary and secondary CU groups did not differ in age, ethnicity, or any scales of the 
ICU. Of the youth classified as primary, none met full DSM-IV criteria for a diagnosis of 
PTSD, whereas 51% of youth classified as secondary and 15% of the comparison sample 
met full criteria.  
Independent samples t-tests were also conducted to investigate differences 
between the high-CU groups and the lower-CU groups. The high-CU youth (including 
both primary and secondary youth) reported greater levels of PTSD symptoms, t (399) = 
2.59, p = .01, and CU traits, t (407) = 26.43, p < .001, but not anxiety, as compared to the 
low-CU comparison group. When looked at separately, both primary, t (352) = 21.44, p < 
.001, and secondary, t (332) = 19.06, p < .001, groups scored higher on total CU traits as 
compared to the comparison group. When compared to the lower-CU comparison youth, 
primary CU youth reported fewer PTSD symptoms, t (201.15) = -4.48, p < .001, but did 
not differ in age or anxiety. When compared to the lower-CU comparison sample, 
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secondary CU youth reported greater levels of PTSD symptoms, t (127.63) = 12.31, p < 
.001, and anxiety, t (318) = 3.43, p = .001, but did not differ in age. 
 
Differences in Emotion Dysregulation  
 Following the establishment of two classes of youth based on PTSD scores, 
consistent with primary and secondary CU variants who are high in CU traits, a second 
model was run to examine how the groups differed on facets of emotion dysregulation. 
The model used Monte Carlo integration to predict class membership from subscale 
scores on the DERS. Due to the limited sample size, the model was simplified by using 
scale scores for each DERS subscale as well as total PTSD symptoms in order to reduce 
the amount of estimated parameters, and DERS subscales were allowed to correlate.  In 
order to ensure that the same classes were created as in the original mixture model, the 
posterior probabilities from the previous model were included as training data in this new 
model that added the DERS subscales. The model was run simultaneously for all 
subscales of the DERS, and therefore the following results represent the unique effect for 
each subscale, after controlling for each of the others. Model results suggested that class 
membership differed significantly for the DERS subscales of lack of emotional clarity, B 
= -.63, SE = .28, 95% CI = [-1.18, -0.09], p = .023, and nonacceptance of emotional 
responses, B = -.56, SE = .27, 95% CI = [-1.09, -0.03], p = .039. Logistic regression odds 
ratio results indicated that, compared to the secondary group, membership in the primary 
group was approximately half as likely as scores increased on nonacceptance of 
emotional responses, OR = 0.57, 95% CI = [0.39, 0.97], shown in Figure 1, and lack of 
emotional clarity, OR = 0.53, 95% CI = [0.31, 0.92], shown in Figure 2 and, although 
only a trend approaching statistical significance, membership in the primary group was 
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also about half as likely as scores increased on limited access to emotion regulation 
strategies, OR = 0.57, 95% CI = [0.32, 1.03], p = .064, shown in Figure 3. Although not 
significant, membership in the primary CU group was more likely as scores increased on 
the subscales of lack of awareness, OR = 1.37, 95% CI = [0.86, 2.20], p > .10, shown in 
Figure 4, and lack of impulse control, OR = 1.19, 95% CI = [0.67, 2.14], p > .10, shown 
in Figure 5, but the likelihood of membership in the primary CU group decreased as 
scores increased on difficulty engaging in goal-directed behavior, OR = 0.71, 95% CI = 
[0.46, 1.09], p > .10, shown in Figure 6. Overall, the results suggest that secondary youth 
reported significantly greater difficulties with emotional clarity and nonacceptance of 
emotional responses as compared to youth with primary CU traits. 
 The primary and secondary groups of youth also were compared to the 
comparison group on facets of emotion dysregulation using independent-samples t-tests. 
The high-CU group (including both primary and secondary CU youth) differed from the 
comparison sample on the DERS subscales of lack of emotional awareness, t (255.53) = 
9.90, p < .001, lack of emotional clarity, t (387) = 5.09, p < .001, and impulse control 
difficulties, t (387) = 2.51, p = .013. The primary group reported higher scores on the 
subscales of lack of emotional awareness, t (334) = 8.67, p < .001, and lack of emotional 
clarity, t (334) = 2.57, p = .011, when compared to the comparison sample. In turn, the 
secondary group reported greater difficulty than the comparison group on each scale of 
emotion dysregulation: lack of emotional awareness, t (314) = 6.10, p < .001, lack of 
emotional clarity, t (314) = 5.69, p < .001, impulse control difficulties, t (314) = 3.14, p = 
.002, difficulty engaging in goal-directed behavior, t (314) = 2.87, p = .004, 
nonacceptance of emotional responses, t (314) = 2.33, p = .021, and limited access to 






Probability of membership in primary CU group with changes in nonacceptance of 
emotional responses. Values shown are for the mean, one standard deviation below the 






Probability of membership in primary CU group with changes in lack of clarity of 
emotions. Values shown are for the mean, one standard deviation below the mean, and 






Probability of membership in primary CU group with changes in limited access to 
emotion regulation strategies. Values shown are for the mean, one standard deviation 






Probability of membership in primary CU group with changes in lack of emotional 
awareness. Values shown are for the mean, one standard deviation below the mean, and 







Probability of membership in primary CU group with changes in impulse control 
difficulties. Values shown are for the mean, one standard deviation below the mean, and 







Probability of membership in primary CU group with changes in difficulty engaging in 
goal-directed behavior. Values shown are for the mean, one standard deviation below the 









The groups of youth identified as having primary and secondary CU traits in the 
current study descriptively resemble groups with similar traits identified in previous 
studies. The secondary group reported significantly higher levels of anxiety, which is 
consistent with the findings of other researchers (e.g., Krischer & Sevecke, 2008; Lee et 
al., 2010; Skeem, et al., 2003). Moreover, the current study found these established 
differences while utilizing a novel approach to determining group membership based on 
trauma theory. In the present study, the groups were composed on the basis of PTSD 
symptoms, which is consistent with Porter’s (1996) theory regarding the role of 
emotional responses to trauma exposure in the development of CU. Porter (1996) argued 
that individuals who have experienced trauma may develop a learned emotional 
detachment as a method of self-protection, resulting in a callous presentation. In this 
sense, Porter’s conceptualization of the origins of secondary CU is more closely related 
to traumatic emotional reactions rather than to general trait anxiety. Consistent with the 
predictions derived from Porter’s theory, the primary and secondary groups differed in 
their self-reports of PTSD symptoms, trauma exposure, and anxiety, which is similar to 
the findings of others who examined similar constructs among primary and secondary CU 
using anxiety to differentiate the groups (e.g., Tatar et al., 2012; Vaughn et al., 2009). 
Overall, the results of the composition of clusters suggest that using PTSD symptoms to 
differentiate primary and secondary groups of high-CU youth achieves clusters similar to 
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those identified using anxiety as a differentiator, while maintaining closer adherence to 
the theory underlying secondary psychopathy.  
Whereas Porter’s (1996) theory of secondary CU suggests that PTSD has an 
influence on callousness for some individuals, previous studies have generally used trait 
anxiety to differentiate primary and secondary CU. However, this method may be 
measuring only one aspect of the emotional difficulties associated with PTSD. The 
recently proposed Dysphoric Arousal model of PTSD (Elhai, Biehn, Armour, Klopper, 
Frueh, & Palmieri, 2011) supports the presence of five factors of PTSD symptoms: 
intrusion, avoidance, numbing, dysphoric arousal, and anxious arousal. Support for this 
model suggests that the anxious arousal factor is associated with unique outcomes 
relative to other factors. Anxious arousal represents a facet of the symptom presentation 
of PTSD that is rooted in fear responses (Elhai et al., 2011), yet recent research indicates 
that reactions to trauma span beyond just fear (Kerig & Bennett, 2012; Friedman, et al., 
2011). Future research would benefit from utilizing all clusters of the five-factor model of 
PTSD in order to investigate how PTSD symptom profiles might be predicted by emotion 
dysregulation patterns for high-CU youth. 
Comparison of group means showed that high-CU youth classified as primary 
and secondary differed from the lower-CU comparison group on both the grouping 
variable of PTSD symptoms and the external variables included in the present study. 
Most notably, the secondary group reported higher levels of PTSD symptoms, anxiety, 
and all facets of emotion dysregulation when compared to the comparison sample. These 
findings are consistent with the conceptualization that secondary CU youth have higher 
levels of general distress than do primary or low-CU youth (Vaughn et al., 2009), which 
has implications for the clinical treatment for this population, suggesting that clinical 
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interventions reducing distress may also reduce delinquency. Youth in the primary group 
did not report significantly higher levels of anxiety compared to the lower-CU youth, 
which is inconsistent with what is generally considered the key defining feature of 
psychopathy. There is a growing discussion of whether or not absence of anxiety is 
characteristic of primary psychopathy as compared to the general population (e.g., Dolan 
& Rennie, 2007; Schmitt & Newman, 1999), and the current findings suggest that youth 
with primary CU traits do not report lower levels of anxiety compared to their low-CU 
counterparts. Studies that only include youth high in CU traits have the potential to 
overlook the differences and similarities between youth with high and low CU traits. 
Therefore, including youth both high and low in CU traits allows for researchers to test 
the assumptions underlying the separation of high-CU youth. Despite not differing on 
reports of anxiety, youth typologized as primary CU differed from the comparison 
sample by virtue of reporting greater difficulty on the emotion dysregulation facets of 
lack of awareness and lack of clarity. These results are consistent with the theory 
underlying psychopathy and CU more classically, in that primary CU youth are thought 
to have an inherent deficit in emotional processing (Cleckley, 1941), leading to difficulty 
identifying and differentiating emotional states as compared to their low-CU 
counterparts. The results of the present study suggest that although anxiety may not 
differentiate primary CU youth from low-CU youth, the difficulties with emotion 
processing underlying CU may still set these groups apart. 
Comparisons of emotion dysregulation across groups showed that youth 
typologized as secondary CU reported greater difficulty with nonacceptance of emotional 
responses as well as greater lack of clarity of their emotional states than did youth 
typologized as primary CU. One possible explanation for this finding is that 
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nonacceptance of distressing emotional states may be indicative of engagement in 
emotional numbing for this group.  In other words, it may be that, consistent with Porter’s 
(1996) argument, secondary psychopathy develops as a function of youths’ disavowing 
their emotions subsequent to the experience of trauma. This argument is also consistent 
with betrayal trauma theory (Freyd, 1996), which suggests that individuals who have 
been victims of trauma perpetrated by close, trusted individuals, such as a parent or 
caregiver, are motivated to preserve the relationship despite the abuse and therefore are 
more likely to disengage from their emotions in order to avoid acknowledging the abuse. 
Consistent with this idea, Kerig et al. (2012) found that youth who experienced numbing 
of fear and sadness specifically in response to betrayal trauma exposure also reported 
higher CU traits, suggesting that betrayal trauma may play a particular role in the 
association between emotional numbing and the development of CU traits. The greater 
lack of clarity in emotional states reported by secondary CU youth as compared to 
primary CU also may be related to emotional numbing. Rather than being unable to 
differentiate their own emotional states, secondary CU youth may be unwilling to try to 
differentiate their emotions in order to avoid feeling vulnerable and thereby create a 
façade of toughness (Ford et al., 2006).  
The findings of the current study may also have implications for informing the 
DSM-5 diagnostic criteria for PTSD. These results suggest that high-CU youth with 
PTSD symptoms experience greater nonacceptance and lack of clarity of emotional 
responses than do other youth, yet it is notable that these emotion regulation difficulties 
are not included in the PTSD diagnostic criteria. Moreover, in the proposed changes to 
the DSM-5, emotional numbing symptoms are not given their own symptom cluster, 
despite evidence supporting such a factor structure (e.g., Bennett, Kerig, Chaplo, McGee, 
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& Baucom, under review; Elhai et al., 2011; King et al., 1998). However, difficulties 
accepting emotional responses and lack of clarity of emotional responses by youth 
classified in the secondary CU variant may represent an unwillingness to recognize 
unpleasant emotional states, which is indicative of a process of emotional numbing or 
experiential avoidance. Without a unique symptom cluster in the PTSD diagnosis, these 
symptoms may not be clearly identified or effectively used for treatment planning. In 
contrast, these difficulties may be better captured by the proposed Developmental 
Trauma Disorder (DTD) diagnosis (van der Kolk et al., 2009) which includes a set of 
symptoms related to dysregulated emotion, including dissociation from awareness of 
bodily states and impaired ability to describe emotional states. The proposed DTD 
diagnosis also includes a set of symptoms related to behavioral and attentional 
dysregulation, as well as other emotional difficulties measured by the DERS, such as 
difficulty engaging in goal-directed behavior. The results of the current study offer 
evidence in support of the consideration of such symptoms for youth who have been 
exposed to trauma and also are experiencing PTSD symptoms. Youths’ reactions to 
traumatic events may be impairing their functioning through these identified aspects of 
emotion dysregulation, and these difficulties may not be identified or highlighted in 
treatment planning unless they are specified in the diagnostic criteria.  
In turn, contrary to our hypothesis, youth in the primary and secondary CU 
categories did not differ on impulse control difficulties in the present sample. This 
finding is inconsistent with patterns identified by others in the literature (Anestis, Anestis, 
& Joiner, 2009; Kimonis et al., 2011; Snowden & Gray, 2011). One possible explanation 
for this unexpected finding may be that the impulse control difficulties subscale of the 
DERS is not a comprehensive measure of impulsivity. However, there is some evidence 
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to suggest that both variants of high-CU individuals may struggle with impulse control 
difficulties, but that impulsivity looks different in each group (Ray, Poythress, Weir, & 
Rickelm, 2009). The dual deficit model of psychopathy (Fowles & Dindo, 2006) 
proposes that primary psychopathy may be related to sensation-seeking or “exploratory” 
impulsivity due to decreased responsiveness to punishment cues and a diminished sense 
of fear, whereas secondary psychopathy is associated with deficits in executive 
functioning which results in poorer planning and more impulsive behavior. It is possible 
that the impulse control difficulties subscale of the DERS may not be accurately 
assessing either of these dimensions of impulsivity. Therefore, future research would 
benefit from inclusion of a more comprehensive measure of impulsivity to better 
understand how these two groups of high-CU youth may be struggling with different 
aspects of impulsivity.  
Research on the factor structure of the DERS has suggested that the emotional 
awareness subscale may represent a unique construct (Bardeen et al., 2012), and the 
results of the current study may support the distinction between emotional awareness and 
emotion regulation among high-CU youth. Compared to youth in the primary CU group, 
youth in the secondary CU group scored higher on all subscales of emotion dysregulation 
except for lack of emotional awareness. The fact that the two groups of youth did not 
differ significantly on the subscale of emotional awareness was consistent with our 
hypothesis that both of these groups may struggle with awareness of their own emotions. 
Taken in combination with the other findings of this study, one possible explanation may 
be that there are different mechanisms underlying the lack of emotional awareness for 
youth in the primary and secondary groups. Primary CU is theorized to be related to an 
inherent deficit in emotional processing, which may even be related to 
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neuropsychological differences such as reduced amygdala activation to distress cues and 
impaired connectivity between the amygdala and ventromedial prefrontal cortex (Marsh 
et al., 2008). Whereas those differences have been observed in studies of high-CU 
individuals’ responses to others’ distress cues, it is possible that individuals with primary 
CU traits have similar deficits in the awareness of their own emotional states. In contrast, 
different patterns likely are involved in the reduction in emotional awareness found 
among youth with secondary CU traits. If youth with secondary CU are aware of their 
emotions but are unclear about them and are unwilling to accept them, they may engage 
in effortful experiential avoidance strategies in order to distance themselves from their 
emotional experience. Experiential avoidance has been associated with PTSD (Kashdan, 
Morina, & Priebe, 2009; Marx & Sloan, 2005; Morina, Stangier, & Risch, 2008; Plumb, 
Orsillo, & Luterek, 2004) but to date has not been investigated in relation to CU in the 
aftermath of trauma. Another related construct may be dissociation, which may provide 
secondary CU youth with a mechanism for separating their emotional experiences from 
direct awareness. For example, Tatar and colleagues (2012) found that adolescents with 
secondary CU were nearly 2.5 times more likely to report a dissociative experience than 
were youth with primary CU. Given these findings, future research would benefit from 
further exploring the roles of experiential avoidance and dissociation in the development 
of secondary CU. 
The difficulties in emotion regulation found in the present study comparing 
primary and secondary variants of CU hold a number of implications for understanding 
how emotion regulation is associated with delinquency. Emotion dysregulation may 
influence delinquency directly through increasing reactive aggression, as has been 
suggested for secondary CU youth (Kimonis et al., 2011), or indirectly, through 
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impairing relationships with others and increasing impulsivity (Frick et al., 2003; Frick & 
Morris, 2004; Moffitt, 1993). Emotion dysregulation also serves to maintain symptoms of 
PTSD among those youth in the secondary CU group. Youth with PTSD may perceive 
their own emotional states to be overwhelming and therefore may be motivated to avoid 
stimuli that elicit emotional responses (Tull et al., 2007). In turn, because PTSD has been 
linked to increased recidivism for some youth (Becker et al., 2011), the maintenance of 
PTSD for secondary CU youth may also maintain patterns of delinquency. This 
conceptualization of the role of emotion dysregulation in PTSD is consistent with 
Horowitz’s (2011) work, which suggested that dysregulated emotion is the product of 
attempts to reach an emotional equilibrium between symptoms such as re-experiencing 
and numbing of emotional responses. The current study expands the conceptualization of 
PTSD as a disorder of emotion dysregulation by relating difficulties with regulation to 
delinquency among adolescents. 
Limitations to the current study include that all data were self-reported and 
collected cross-sectionally. In order to address these limitations, future research should 
include multiple reporters where possible and consider collecting data across multiple 
time points to better investigate how relations among variables may be changing over 
time. Self-report methodology addressing CU traits is inherently limited, given that 
psychopathy is associated with a tendency to manipulate others (Cleckley, 1941). 
However, although controversial, some studies to date have suggested that CU traits can 
be reliably self-reported because by nature CU traits represent internal states that cannot 
be easily observed by others (Lilienfeld & Fowler, 2006). Another potential limitation 
associated with self-report is that secondary CU youth may mask their distress through 
emotional detachment, thus self-reporting inaccurately (Kalisch et al., 2005). 
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Physiological measurements, largely unsusceptible to impression management, have the 
potential to detect whether or not secondary CU youth are truly “callous” under the 
surface, and future studies would benefit from including psychophysiological indicators 
in addition to self-report.  
 Despite the aforementioned limitations, the current study has a number of 
strengths that contribute to the literature on secondary CU traits, PTSD, and emotion 
dysregulation. First, this study is among the first to distinguish primary and secondary 
CU traits in a sample including both detained boys and girls. Because previous studies 
have suggested a stronger link between trauma and delinquency for girls than boys (Kerig 
& Becker, 2010), use of a mixed-gender sample allows for a broader understanding of the 
interrelations of these concepts among delinquent youth. Additionally, this is the first 
known study to examine emotion dysregulation among primary and secondary groups of 
high-CU youth, combining the literature on PTSD as a disorder of emotion dysregulation 
with what is known about emotional deficits in high-CU individuals. The integration of 
these two literatures allows for a clearer understanding of the emotional functioning of 
the secondary CU group in particular. An additional original contribution of the current 
study is the use of PTSD symptoms to form the primary and secondary clusters of high-
CU youth. Previous studies have generally used trait anxiety as the differentiating 
variable, despite mixed evidence of the association between CU and anxiety (Dolan & 
Rennie, 2007). It is possible that while a lack of anxiety is characteristic of classic 
psychopathy, it serves less well to distinguish between primary and secondary variants. In 
the current study, primary CU youth did not differ significantly from the comparison 
sample on a measure of anxiety, which further calls into question whether anxiety is an 
effective differentiator of the callous-unemotional subtype, especially among youth. The 
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use of PTSD symptoms as the differentiating variable in the current study is consistent 
with Porter’s (1996) theory regarding the origins of secondary psychopathy and therefore 
may provide a better representation of primary and secondary CU traits. However, this 
methodology should be examined with additional samples.  
 Finally, the current study has a number of clinical implications. High-CU 
individuals are thought to commit the most serious, violent offenses, to respond poorly to 
treatment, and to be difficult to rehabilitate (Frick & Ellis, 1999; Hawes & Dadds, 2005; 
Kruh, Frick, & Clements, 2005). The risk faced by failing to differentiate between youth 
typologized as primary and secondary variants is that youth with high levels of 
psychological distress may be overlooked for treatment, and  it is especially important for 
youth whose PTSD symptoms may be directly influencing recidivism (Becker et al., 
2012). As these youth appear more callous over time, they may also appear more out of 
reach of treatment interventions (Frick, 2009). Therapeutic interventions may be most 
effective if they include a focus on the development of effective emotion regulation 
strategies after first working with youth to better identify, label, and differentiate between 
emotional responses.  
 In conclusion, the current study offers support for the presence of two distinct 
subgroups of juvenile justice-involved youth high in CU traits. These groups differ on 
measures of anxiety, PTSD symptoms, and aspects of emotion dysregulation, including 
lack of clarity and nonacceptance of emotional responses. Group differences in emotion 
dysregulation may be related to the process of emotional numbing in response to 
traumatic events. Consequently, these differences have implications for our 
understanding of secondary CU, the links between trauma and delinquency, and the 
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